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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

INDIANA
Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 882 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that a state agency may determine the average normal
water level of a public lake through a procedure in related code sections when the applicable code section does not specify a method for
determining this level, and the related code sections address the same
subject).
The Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") filed suit
against the current and former owners of a campground, Larry Bowyer
and Karen Garling (collectively "Bowyer") to stop the illegal dumping
of debris into Lake Cicott, a lake adjacent to the campground. Bowyer
requested a determination of whether the lake was public, and thus
subject to DNR regulation. The Circuit Court of Cass County found
that Lake Cicott was public. Bowyer appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Indiana and the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The
DNR obtained a temporary restraining order against Bowyer from
conducting any construction activities below the shoreline of Lake Cicott. Thereafter, the DNR determined the shoreline to be 702 feet
above sea level, and filed a motion to hold Bowyer in contempt for violating the temporary restraining order through continued construction activities below the DNR-determined shoreline. The trial court
found Bowyer in contempt.
The court reversed the trial court's finding because the temporary
restraining order was too vague in the meaning of "shoreline" and the
DNR failed to give Bowyer notice of its shoreline determination.
Bowyer filed a motion with the trial court for a formal determination
of the average water level of Lake Cicott, and the trial court ordered
the DNR to file a report pursuant to Indiana Code Chapter 14-26-4
("Chapter 4"). After reviewing the report, the trial court entered
judgment, finding the legal lake level for Lake Cicott to be 702 feet
above sea level. The trial court based its judgment on the DNR's procedure for measuring the shoreline of a lake, found in Indiana Code
Chapter 14-26-2 ("Chapter 2"). The DNR prepared a report and attached the data necessary to establish the legal lake level of Lake Cicott, pursuant to Chapter 4. Bowyer did not present any credible evidence to counter the level that the DNR calculated. Bowyer appealed
the judgment.
Bowyer argued that the trial court should have determined the average normal water level using Chapter 4, the average normal water
level statute, instead of Chapter 2, the lake preservation statute. According to Bowyer, Chapter 4 was the governing statute and it required
at least ten years of observation to determine the average normal water
level. The DNR, in one day, calculated the average normal water level
of Lake Cicott by taking the average of nine points along the line of
demarcation on the lakebed.
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The Court concluded that Bowyer's argument was a challenge to
the trial court's construction of the statutes. The Court said that the
goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. If the legislative intent is clear
from the language of the statute, the language prevails and the court
will give it effect. Where statutes address the same subject, they are in
pari material,and the Court will harmonize them if possible.
In this case, the Court stated that Chapter 4 authorized the DNR to
determine Lake Cicott's average normal water level. However, Chapter
4 did not specify the procedure for measuring the average normal water level. The trial court analyzed related code sections for procedures
to measure the average normal water level of Lake Cicott, and found a
procedure in Chapter 2. Because Chapters 2 and 4 both governed the
management of public lakes, the two chapters were in pari material,and
the Court determined that the trial court did not err in using a Chapter 2 procedure for measuring the level of a public lake when no procedure existed in Chapter 4. Additionally, the Court concluded that
Bowyer incorrectly construed Chapter 4. The Court stated that the
plain language of Chapter 4 required a report that contained the data
necessary to compute the ten-year high water level of Lake Cicott, but
the report need not compute that figure. The DNR correctly used the
procedure in Chapter 2 to calculate this level.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court establishing the
legal level of Lake Cicott to be 702 feet above sea level.
Adam Hernandez
Ctr. Townhouse Corp. v. City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (affirming the district court holding that construction of a
footbridge across a river, connecting two pieces of city owned property,
constituted a taking of certain riparian rights of adjacent private landowners, but holding further that Indiana does not recognize a riparian right to an unobstructed view of the water).
Center Townhouse Corporation and individual riverfront property
owners ("Landowners") brought an inverse condemnation action
against the City of Mishawaka ("City") arising from the construction of
a pedestrian bridge across a river, connecting two pieces of city property. The Landowners sought damages on the claim that construction of
the bridge resulted in a taking of certain riparian property rights without just compensation, including the right to an unobstructed view of
the river. The City argued that as the bridge was built entirely on City
property and did not physically occupy private property, it was not a
taking. In addition, the City claimed that the bridge did not substantially interfere with Landowners' riparian rights or otherwise diminish
property values. The City also noted that its riparian rights are equal
to Landowners' riparian rights and should not be subordinate.

